Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 36

Issue 4

Article 5

5-11-2020

OF MONOPOLIES AND MONOCULTURES: THE INTERSECTION OF
PATENTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Duan, Charles

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Duan, Charles, OF MONOPOLIES AND MONOCULTURES: THE INTERSECTION OF PATENTS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 369 ().
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol36/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of Santa Clara
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com, pamjadi@scu.edu.

OF MONOPOLIES AND MONOCULTURES:
THE INTERSECTION OF PATENTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
By Charles Duan1
Recent conversations about patent policy are increasingly
incorporating themes of national security. In particular, the national security
dimensions of “races” against technological superpowers such as China, in
fields such as artificial intelligence (AI), fifth-generation (5G) mobile
communications networks, and quantum computing, has given rise to a
national dialogue on spurring domestic innovation, a dialogue into which
patents naturally fit. As a result, national security has made a notable
appearance in recent key patent policy situations, including the patent subject
matter eligibility hearings in the Senate, the Apple–Qualcomm–Federal Trade
Commission litigation over patents and antitrust, and the Verizon–Huawei
patent licensing dispute. Many of these situations have given rise to an
intuitively attractive though simplistic argument: If national security depends
on rapid innovation and patents encourage innovation, then stronger patent
protection enhances national security.
This Article challenges this logic on the relationship between patents
and national security, in particular by considering that relationship from the
lens of competition. It first turns to history, reviewing several instances in
which patent protection has clashed with national security interests. These
historical instances, which include pre–World War I torpedo development, the
birth of the aviation industry, and post-9/11 bioterrorism responses,
demonstrate how the competition-suppressing effects of aggressive patent
1
Copyright 2019–2020 Charles Duan. Director of Technology and Innovation Policy, R Street
Institute, Washington, D.C. This Article represents the author’s individual views and does not
necessarily reflect the views of other scholars at the R Street Institute. The author would like to
thank Jim Baker, John Bergmayer, Wayne Brough, Walter Evans, L. Zachary Graves, Joshua
Landau, Alexandra Moss, Christina Pesavento, Abby Rives, Paul Rosenzweig, Brian Scarpelli,
Charlotte Slaiman, Tom Struble, Daniel Takash, Kathryn Waldron, Caleb Watney, K. William
Watson, Rachel Wolbers, and several attorneys involved in the litigation discussed below, for
their insights that contributed to the author’s understanding of the subject matter, as well as the
staff of the Library of Congress. The author would also like to thank the editors of the Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal for their excellent suggestions and revisions to this article.
Portions of this article were previously submitted in a federal agency comment a submitted
statement to a congressional hearing, and an amicus curiae brief. See Public Interest Submission
of the R Street Institute et al., In re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 64875 (Int’l
Trade Comm’n Feb. 6, 2019) (Inv. No. 337-TA-1065), available at https://www.rstreet.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/comments-itc-1065-qva-long.pdf; 5G: National Security Concerns,
Intellectual Property Issues, and the Impact on Competition and Innovation: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (submitted statement of Charles Duan, R Street
Institute), available at https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/testimony-iotcybersecurity-2.pdf; Brief of the R Street Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffAppellee, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2019).
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assertion can diminish national security. Second, this Article considers the
effects of diminished competition on cybersecurity, a critical component of
modern national security. Economic research shows that competition can
enhance cybersecurity, and thus patent-based limits on competition can
weaken cybersecurity, both by generating economic incentives to make more
secure products and by preventing the formation of technology
“monocultures.” These historical and contemporary competition
considerations thus lend to policy that balance patent incentives and the value
of competition to drive forward security-sensitive technological development.
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INTRODUCTION
It was certainly an odd thing for the Department of Justice attorney
arguing for the United States to appear before the Ninth Circuit to tell the
appellate judges that a federal agency was wrong.2 This was what happened
in a Federal Trade Commission enforcement action against Qualcomm Inc., a
semiconductor technology company.3 As a substantial holder of patents on
mobile communications technologies and also a leading manufacturer of chips
used in that same industry, the FTC charged Qualcomm with anticompetitive
conduct; the district court agreed and enjoined Qualcomm from certain patent
licensing practices.4 It was that award of injunctive relief which led the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to oppose its administrative
counterpart, arguing among other things that the injunction had been
improvidently granted in view of the public interest.5
Yet as unexpected as the executive branch infighting alone might have
been, the grounds for the Justice Department’s objection was perhaps
unexpected as well. In justifying how the public interest disfavored a remedy
on patent licensing, the department reached to a rationale that ordinarily would
seem to have nothing to do with patents: national security.6 By limiting
Qualcomm’s ability to license its patents, the department argued, the
injunction would result in “diminishment of Qualcomm’s competitiveness”
and thus “could harm U.S. national security.”7
The Department of Justice has not been alone in drawing a tie between
patent policy and national security. Recently, this tie has come up in multiple
discussions of patent policy, ranging from hearings on patent subject matter
eligibility to patent adjudication before the U.S. International Trade
Commission.8 In those contexts, the Justice Department and many others have
advanced a seemingly simple logical argument on how patents implicate
national security. It is generally accepted that American national security
depends on rapid innovation in certain security-sensitive technologies, such as
artificial intelligence and telecommunications.9 It is also generally accepted
that patent protection, being a valuable right granted to inventors, provides an
2
See Oral argument at 18:13, Qualcomm, No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.
ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000017078 (Rawlinson, J.) (“We have two
parts of the government here today; that’s really . . . interesting.”).
3
See generally id.
4
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 820–24 (N.D. Cal. May 21,
2019), appeal filed, No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 13, 2020).
5
See Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant and
Vacatur at 29–34, Qualcomm, No. 19-16122 (Aug. 30, 2019), Doc. No. 86 [hereinafter
Qualcomm DOJ Amicus Brief].
6
See id. at 6, 32.
7
Id. at 32; see infra notes 74–87.
8
See generally infra Part I (summarizing recent developments relating to patents and national
security).
9
See infra notes 18–28.
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economic stimulus for innovation.10 Therefore, maintaining patent protection
or even strengthening it ought to further national security; limiting patent
rights would conversely “harm U.S. national security” as the Justice
Department put it.11
This syllogistic equating of patent protection and national security,
though perhaps initially attractive, appears on closer inspection to be overly
simplistic. The purpose of this Article is to challenge this line of reasoning,
showing that patent rights, and in particular unbridled assertion of patents, can
impair and repeatedly has impaired national security interests. It reaches this
conclusion by considering patents and national security through the lens of
competition. Patents by definition suppress competition to some degree,12 so
insofar as competition can enhance national security in certain ways, patents
can diminish national security when used or licensed in particularly aggressive
ways. To establish the relationship between patents and national security, then,
this Article also contemplates how competition relates to national security.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews how patent policy has
recently intersected with national security. It first explains the primary basis
for relating innovation policy generally with national security, namely
ongoing technological “races” in security-sensitive technologies. It then
discusses recent events that have given rise to interest in and arguments over
how patent law and policy can affect national security interests, particularly
those relating to the aforementioned technology races, and identifies the
appearance of the syllogistic argument that patent protection uniformly
increases national security.
The remainder of the Article interrogates the syllogistic argument,
primarily on two fronts. Part II takes a historical perspective, considering three
past anecdotes in which patents have run headlong into national security.13
While each of the three examples—torpedo development prior to World War
I, patent licensing in early aviation, and bioterrorism threats following the
September 11th attacks—offers unique insights and lessons (plus an
unexpected factoid on The Sound of Music14), the common thread is that
aggressive assertion and licensing of patents, by creating an environment
devoid of competition, can stymie important government interests in national
defense and security. Part III considers cybersecurity, which is closely tied to

10
See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The patent laws
promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development.”).
11
Qualcomm DOJ Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 32.
12
See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 663 (1969) (“[T]he grant of monopoly power to
a patent owner constituted a limited exception to the general federal policy favoring free
competition.”).
13
See infra Part II.
14
See infra Part II.A.
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national security.15 Reviewing economic and computer science research, Part
III identifies two reasons why competition enhances cybersecurity:
Competition encourages firms to improve cybersecurity as a market-driven
value-add, and it prevents the formation of single-vendor “monocultures” of
technology that have been shown to be especially susceptible to cyberattacks.
Tying any policy field to national security is consequential, because “to
securitize an activity or state-of-affairs is to present it as an urgent, imminent,
extensive, and existential threat” to the nation at large, thereby justifying
“extraordinary responses” that “typically involve bending rules of normal
governance.”16 That is no less true for patent policy: The risk of overly
simplistic approach to how patents affect national security could easily be to
justify unwarranted expansions of patent protection that could end up
undermining the very object sought to be achieved. Accordingly, Part IV
offers policy recommendations on how best to address the more nuanced
relationship between patents and national security, especially in view of
effects on competition.17
I.

FACETS OF THE CURRENT DEBATE

National security is increasingly a component of debates over patent and
competition policy. This section describes several contexts in which national
security has come up in this debate.
A. The Race to 5G (and AI, and Quantum Computing)
The backdrop to many of the ties between national security and patent
policy has been a number of technology “races” with foreign nations, most
notably China. In recent years, China has made significant strides toward
positioning itself as a leader in a number of important future technologies.18
The government’s 2015 report Made in China 2025 identified several key
technology fields, including pharmaceuticals, aerospace, information
technology, and robotics, in which the Chinese government intended to make
strategic pushes through policy and funding.19

15

See infra Part III.
Helen Nissenbaum, Where Computer Security Meets National Security, 7 ETHICS & INFO.
TECH. 61, 66, 69 (2005).
17
See infra Part IV.
18
See, e.g., ANDRÉS ORTEGA, THE U.S.–CHINA RACE AND THE FATE OF TRANSATLANTIC
RELATIONS, PART 1: TECH, VALUES, AND COMPETITION 4–7 (2020), https://www.csis.org/
analysis/us-china-race-and-fate-transatlantic-relations.
19
See STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., MADE IN CHINA 2025, § 3.6, at 22–27 (IoT One trans.,
2015), http://www.cittadellascienza.it/cina/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IoT-ONE-Made-inChina-2025.pdf; Scott Kennedy, Critical Questions: Made in China 2025, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC
& INT’L STUD. (June 1, 2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025.
16
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At least two of these technology areas have raised the eyebrows of
national security experts: 5G and artificial intelligence.20 The former, which
relates to new (5th-Generation) wireless telecommunications protocols under
development,21 has led to conversations about the “Race to 5G” between the
United States and China.22 While the concept of a “race” is obviously
metaphorical—there is no defined finish line, among other things—there
certainly are national security concerns arising from 5G development.23
Because the technology enables a vastly larger and different class of devices
to enter the wireless ecosystem, 5G presents new issues of cybersecurity and
also potentially far-reaching military applications.24 Furthermore, the
protocols of 5G systems are set in international multistakeholder standardsetting consortia, meaning that the nation who has the lead in developing
aspects of 5G technology will have an advantage during the standard-setting
process.25 It is for these reasons that national security experts warn that “the
United States and its allies cannot fall substantially behind China in 5G
implementation.”26
Artificial intelligence has given rise to similar concerns, with experts
worrying that China’s massive investments in AI research could lead the
country to possess superior computer software technologies, possibly tied to
military applications.27 And lest it be thought that the United States is in only
two races, commentators have also pointed to a race for “quantum
supremacy,” relating to an advanced computing technology with the potential

20
See, e.g., Nitin Dahad, US, China Vying for AI and 5G Supremacy, EE TIMES (Apr. 19, 2019),
https://www.eetimes.com/us-china-vying-for-ai-and-5g-supremacy/.
21
See Jeffrey G. Andrews et al., What Will 5G Be?, 32 IEEE J. ON SELECTED AREAS COMM.
1065, 1075 (2014).
22
See Stu Woo, In the Race to Dominate 5G, China Sprints Ahead, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-the-race-to-dominate-5g-china-has-an-edge-11567828888;
Doug Brake, Economic Competitiveness and National Security Dynamics in the Race for 5G
between the United States and China 11–12, in 46 TPRC: RES. CONF. ON COMM. INFO. &
INTERNET POL’Y (2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3142229. But see, e.g., Kevin
Werbach, Opinion: The “Race to 5G” Is a Myth, CNN BUS. (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.cnn.
com/2020/02/03/perspectives/5g-disruption/index.html (disputing that 5G development is a
“race”).
23
See Brake, supra note 22, at 20.
24
See Jim Baker, 5G Networks Must Be Secure and Reliable, LAWFARE (Mar. 13, 2019), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/5g-networks-must-be-secure-and-reliable.
25
See Brake, supra note 22, at 17–18; Eli Greenbaum, 5G, Standard-Setting, and National
Security, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. ONLINE (July 3, 2018), https://harvardnsj.org/2018/07/5gstandard-setting-and-national-security/.
26
Baker, supra note 24.
27
See GREGORY C. ALLEN, UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S AI STRATEGY: CLUES TO CHINESE
STRATEGIC THINKING ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 3–4 (2019),
https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CNAS-Understanding-Chinas-AIStrategy-Gregory-C.-Allen-FINAL-2.15.19.pdf; NAT’L SEC. COMM’N ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE, INTERIM REPORT 11, 17–18 (2019), https://www.epic.org/foia/epic-v-aicommission/AI-Commission-Interim-Report-Nov-2019.pdf.
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for breaking modern encryption.28 The ongoing competition for technical
superiority between the United States and China, in multiple fields, thus has
important national security implications.
Amidst this dialogue has been a concern about whether national security
concerns are masking domestic economic protectionism. When the Trump
Administration instituted tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, for example,
the proffered justification was that steel and aluminum manufacturing
implicated national security because domestic steel industries were necessary
for fabricating weapons, manufacturing military vehicles such as aircraft and
ships, and building critical infrastructure.29 But commentators noted that the
justification was questionable in view of the facts, and wondered whether the
tariffs were in fact no more than a license for existing domestic incumbents to
keep their prices high.30
China has also been accused of “intellectual property theft,” referring to
industrial espionage practices, and “forced technology transfer,” in which the
government requires disclosure of trade-secret technologies as a condition for
doing business in China.31 These practices do not relate to patents, nor could
they given that patents are published for anyone to read.32 While there are no
28
See Arthur Herman, The Quantum Computing Threat to American Security, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 10, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-quantum-computing-threat-to-americansecurity-11573411715.
29
See OFFICE OF TECH. EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF
STEEL ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY: AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 2323 OF
THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962, AS AMENDED 23–24 (2018), https://www.commerce.gov/
sites/default/files/the_effect_of_imports_of_steel_on_the_national_security_-_with_redactions_
-_20180111.pdf; OFFICE OF TECH. EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF
IMPORTS OF ALUMINUM ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY: AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER
SECTION 2323 OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962, AS AMENDED 23–39 (2018), https://
www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/the_effect_of_imports_of_aluminum_on_the_national_
security_-_with_redactions_-_20180117.pdf.
30
See Clark Packard & Megan Reiss, Steel Protectionism Won’t Protect National Security,
LAWFARE (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/steel-protectionism-wont-protectnational-security; Menzie Chinn, What Is the National Security Rationale for Steel, Aluminum
and Automobile Protection?, ECONOFACT (June 6, 2018), https://econofact.org/what-is-thenational-security-rationale-for-steel-aluminum-and-automobile-protection.
31
See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S
ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE AT OF 1974, at 17–18 (2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF (reviewing these practices);
Jyh-An Lee, Shifting IP Battlegrounds in the U.S.–China Trade War, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
147, 183–84 (2020) (noting that U.S. focus on Chinese intellectual property practices has
“shifted” from counterfeiting to “acquiring IP and confidential information”).
32
See Lee, supra note 31, at 183–84; cf. Debora Halbert, Intellectual Property Theft and
National Security: Agendas and Assumptions, 32 INFO. SOC’Y 256, 260 (2016) (noting
government’s and commentators’ failure to “delve into the technical differences between
intellectual property regimes such as copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secrets” when
considering intellectual property “theft”). There are some, even within the government, that
have classified among China’s misappropriations of U.S. technologies the practice of
“systematic, large-scale, open-source collection operations” including “analyzing patents.” See
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF TRADE & MFG. POLICY, HOW CHINA’S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION
THREATENS THE TECHNOLOGIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE WORLD 13 (June 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-
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doubts that national security implications exist for espionage, they are distinct
from any patent-specific concerns and thus not the subject of this Article.
In large part, concerns over China’s relevant innovation practices in 5G,
AI, and other such fields stem from China’s practice of choosing “national
champions,” which include firms that the state heavily subsidizes or even
partially controls in order to bolster the chances that those firms succeed in the
global market.33 In the telecommunications space, for example, Chinese phone
manufacturer Huawei is largely understood to be heavily funded and managed
by the state.34 That China and other nations sponsor these national champions
in technologies has forced American companies and policymakers to think
carefully about how to respond to this form of state-backed competition.35
B. Patent Eligibility of Artificial Intelligence
The national security concerns about these technology races lend to an
easy, if simplistic, argument: If patents provide incentives for innovation, then
increasing patent protection will increase national security by propelling
innovation in technologies such as artificial intelligence and 5G. That
argument has been made multiple times recently, most notably in the context
of legislation over patentable subject matter eligibility.
Eligibility is one of the requirements for an invention to be patentable in
the United States. Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may issue for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.”36 While that language standing alone
appears expansive, courts have interpreted that statute to embody several
historical restrictions on the patentability of certain subject matter.37 In
China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf. The notion that impropriety lies in the mere act of
reading published patents is difficult to reconcile with the very nature of patents as published.
Cf. Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, 35 U.S.C. § 181 (enabling government to “withhold the
publication” of a patent or application if “publication or disclosure by the publication of an
application or by the grant of a patent on an invention in which the Government has a property
interest might, in the opinion of the head of the interested Government agency, be detrimental to
the national security”).
33
See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 31, at 19; NAT’L SEC. COMM’N ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 27, at 21; Dhruva Jaishankar, From the iPhone to
Huawei: The New Geopolitics of Technology, LAWFARE (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.
lawfareblog.com/iphone-huawei-new-geopolitics-technology.
34
See Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Pushes Hard for a Ban on Huawei in Europe, but the Firm’s 5G
Prices Are Nearly Irresistible, WASH. POST (May 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/for-huawei-the-5g-play-is-in-europe--and-the-us-is-pushing-hard-for-aban-there/2019/05/28/582a8ff6-78d4-11e9-b7ae-390de4259661_story.html (“The
company . . . has a silent partner: the Chinese government. Huawei gets hundreds of millions of
dollars in annual subsidies . . . .”).
35
See Sharon Poczter et al., How to Compete Against the New Breed of National Champions,
MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 5–6 (May 30, 2018), http://ilp.mit.edu/media/news_articles/smr/2018/
59431.pdf.
36
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
37
See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–69 (1972) (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 156, 175 (1852); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 111–13 (1853)).
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particular, the Supreme Court has held that “laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not eligible for patenting under § 101.38 In
recent decisions, this eligibility limit has been held to prevent patenting of
isolated human genetic sequences,39 diagnostic test correlations,40 financial
investment strategies,41 and computerized methods for financial
transactions.42
Discontent and uncertainty over these decisions limiting the patent
eligibility of a variety of technologies led to calls for legislation to revise
§ 101, ultimately resulting in the Intellectual Property Subcommittee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee holding a series of hearings on the subject.43
Much of the criticism of § 101 related to the diagnostic testing and life
sciences sector,44 but because one of the Supreme Court’s decisions related to
the eligibility of computer software,45 many commentators feared that the
patent eligibility bar had been set too high for emerging computer technologies
such as artificial intelligence.46
It was this criticism of § 101’s impact on artificial intelligence and other
computer technologies that gave rise to arguments about national security:
Those calling for amending the patent eligibility requirements contended that
if Congress did not amend § 101, then the United States would fall behind in
38

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013).
40
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79–80 (2012).
41
See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010).
42
See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359–60 (2014).
43
See The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part I: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 4, 2019), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-state-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-part-i; The State of
Patent Eligibility in America: Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 5, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
meetings/the-state-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-part-ii; The State of Patent Eligibility in
America: Part III: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 11, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/thestate-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-part-iii.
44
See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(denial of rehearing en banc) (Lourie, J., concurring) (“It is said that the whole category of
diagnostic claims is at risk. It is also said that a crisis of patent law and medical innovation may
be upon us, and there seems to be some truth in that concern.”); Warren D. Woessner & Robin
A. Chadwick, Section 101: What’s Left to Patent in the Life Sciences after Myriad, Mayo, and
Alice, 101 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 121, 158–59 (2019).
45
See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359–60.
46
See, e.g., Andrei Iancu, The Current State of Innovation within the U.S. Legal System—Views
on Evolving Protection for Intellectual Property Rights in the United States from the USPTO
and the Courts, 101 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11, 13 (2019) (disputing § 101
jurisprudence in view of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” when “scientists and engineers are
working at forever faster rates to make advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), robotics,
biotechnology, autonomous vehicles, quantum computing, and so much more”); Smart Sys.
Innovations v. Chi. Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“And the danger of
getting the answers to [patent eligibility] questions wrong is greatest for some of today’s most
important inventions in computing, medical diagnostics, artificial intelligence, the Internet of
Things, and robotics, among other things.”), quoted in The State of Patent Eligibility in
America: Part III, supra note 43 (testimony of Manny Schecter, IBM Corp.).
39
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security-sensitive technologies.47 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Director
Andrei Iancu, for example, has remarked that the United States is “in a
globally-competitive innovation race,” so “to maintain our technological
leadership,” the nation “must be careful not to decide that the automation that
is at the heart of the technologies of the future is somehow not eligible for
patenting.”48
Former Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office David Kappos
has been particularly vocal on the tie between patent eligibility and national
security. In congressional testimony, he has argued that the Supreme Court’s
eligibility jurisprudence “poses not only a threat to our global economic
leadership, but also to our national security,” citing artificial intelligence,
quantum computing, and 5G as examples.49 Kappos’s testimony before the
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property similarly remarked that the “current
constricted approach to Section 101 is undermining investment in
technologies Congress and the Administration consider critical to national
security,” citing to data suggesting that the United States had rejected patent
applications under § 101 that had been allowed for patenting in China and
Europe.50 (The accuracy of that data has been questioned.51)
To be sure, national security appears to be just a talking point with
respect to patent eligibility, rather than the motivating factor for any patent
policy reform. But national security is a powerful talking point,52 and its

47
See, e.g., Brian Pomper, The Real US Patent “Crisis,” THE HILL (Dec. 9, 2019), https://thehill.
com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/473757-the-real-us-patent-crisis (“Restoring clear patent
rights will be essential to maintaining a strong and healthy U.S. innovation ecosystem. That, in
turn, will help U.S. innovators keep up with the fierce international competition to develop the
technologies so critical to the future of U.S. national security, including artificial intelligence,
advanced computing and 5G.”).
48
Iancu, supra note 46, at 13.
49
David J. Kappos, National Security Consequences of U.S. Patent (In)eligibility, MORNING
CONSULT (Nov. 4, 2019), https://morningconsult.com/opinions/national-security-consequencesof-u-s-patent-ineligibility/.
50
See The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part I: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 4, 2019), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kappos%20Testimony.pdf (oral testimony of David
J. Kappos, Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP).
51
The data set, collected by Kappos and Robert Sachs, was analyzed in Kevin Madigan &
Adam Mossoff, Turning Told Into Lead: How Patent Eligibility Doctrine Is Undermining U.S.
Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 941 n.10 (2017). However, of the
exemplary patents discussed in that article, see id. at 957–58 fig.4, a subsequent analysis found
that only one was rejected solely under § 101, and three were not facing a § 101 rejection at all.
See Josh Landau, “Gold Into Lead” Article Focuses on Pyrite Patents, PAT. PROGRESS (June
13, 2018), https://www.patentprogress.org/2018/06/12/gold-into-lead-article-focuses-on-pyritepatents/.
52
Cf. MAROUF HASIAN JR. ET AL., THE RHETORICAL INVENTION OF AMERICA’S NATIONAL
SECURITY STATE 5 (2015) (“The formation and maintenance of America’s national security
state needs to be viewed as a rhetorical accomplishment, something that involves the active
participation of everyone from the president, to military members, to Hollywood directors, and
many more in between.”).
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appearance in dialogues over patent policy suggests a need for careful thought
about how exactly patent policy and national security intersect.
C. Qualcomm
Among the instances where patent policy has intersected with national
security concerns, one name repeatedly appears: Qualcomm Inc., a San
Diego–based semiconductor design firm. The company itself may not be a
household name, but its products are in practically every household, with
between 43% and 52% market share in the baseband processor chips found in
every cell phone.53 Commentators have raised national security in the context
of Qualcomm on too many occasions to count, but at least three specific policy
actions brought the issue to the fore.
1.

The Broadcom Takeover Attempt

In late 2017, Singapore-based Broadcom Ltd. announced its intention to
buy out Qualcomm for $105 billion.54 Being a foreign acquisition of a U.S.
firm, review of the proposed transaction fell to the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, an interagency committee of the
federal government.55 CFIUS ultimately recommended against Broadcom’s
acquisition attempt, and President Trump ratified that decision in an order
prohibiting the acquisition.56
Although the takeover itself did not necessarily implicate either patents
or national security, CFIUS deigned to make it so. In its letter opposing the
acquisition, CFIUS began by describing Qualcomm as a “global leader in the
development and commercialization of foundational technologies” for mobile
communications.57 Qualcomm’s “dominant role” offered “significant
53
See Strategy Analytics, Inc., Strategy Analytics: Q1 2018 Baseband Market Share: Samsung
LSI Overtakes MediaTek, BUSINESSWIRE (July 31, 2018), https://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20180731005614/en/Strategy-Analytics-Q1-2018-Baseband-Market-Share [hereinafter
Strategy Analytics 2018] (52%); Strategy Analytics, Inc., 2Q 2019 Baseband Market Share:
Qualcomm and Samsung Emerge as Early 5G Contenders, BUSINESSWIRE (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191015005732/en/Strategy-Analytics---2Q-2019Baseband-Market [hereinafter Strategy Analytics 2019] (43%). See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d at 690, 695 (finding that Qualcomm “has owned a dominant
share” and “possessed monopoly power” in certain mobile phone chip markets).
54
See Michael J. de la Merced, Broadcom Targets Qualcomm in Biggest Technology Deal Ever,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2017, at B1.
55
See Diane Bartz, Exclusive: Secretive U.S. Security Panel Discussing Broadcom’s Qualcomm
Bid, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-broadcomexclusive-idUSKCN1GB09V.
56
See Order Regarding the Proposed Takeover of Qualcomm Incorporated by Broadcom
Limited, 83 Fed. Reg. 11631, sec. 2(a) (Mar. 15, 2018); Cecilia Kang & Alan Rappeport, Trump
Blocks Broadcom’s Bid for Qualcomm, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/12/technology/trump-broadcom-qualcomm-merger.html.
57
Letter from Aimen N. Mir, Dep’t of the Treasury, to Mark Plotkin & Theodore Kassinger,
CFIUS Case 18-036: Broadcom Limited (Singapore)/Qualcomm Incorporated, U.S. DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY 2 (Mar. 5, 2018), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/cfiusletter.pdf [hereinafter CFIUS Letter].
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confidence” with respect to national security, according to CFIUS.58 Going on
to note that “Qualcomm’s current business model is based upon licensing of
patented Qualcomm technologies,” CFIUS concluded that any changes to that
patent licensing model “could result in a weakening of Qualcomm’s
technological leadership in a manner that is detrimental to U.S. national
security.”59
Put another way, national security depends, in CFIUS’s view, on
Qualcomm’s patent licensing business remaining undisturbed. Indeed,
practitioners noted the unusual nature of this CFIUS action: “While CFIUS
and the president have rejected numerous deals in the past based on the
acquisition of intelligence capabilities or sensitive technology by a foreign
buyer, this is the first deal rejected by a president based squarely on the market
role and competitiveness of the U.S. company.”60 Others have said that the
decision “canonized the San Diego company as a sort of national champion.”61
This remarkable turn of events shows how patents, competition policy, and
national security can unexpectedly cross paths.
2.

The International Trade Commission

In 2017, Apple Inc. filed suit against Qualcomm on the grounds of
anticompetitive behavior.62 In response, Qualcomm brought multiple actions
against Apple for patent infringement, including two actions before the U.S.
International Trade Commission, or ITC, a federal trade agency that has the
power to exclude importation of products deemed to infringe patents.63
Again, although national security was not the issue before the agency, it
nevertheless became a paramount concern in the ITC. Prior to issuing an
exclusion order that would prevent importation of products deemed to infringe
58

Id.
Id. at 3.
60
David Mortlock et al., The President and CFIUS Expand Exercise of CFIUS Authority by
Blocking Broadcom Takeover of Qualcomm, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP 2 (Mar. 14,
2018), https://www.willkie.com/˜/media/Files/Publications/2018/03/The_President_and_
CFIUS_Expand_Exercise_of_CFIUS_Authority.pdf.
61
Ted Greenwald et al., Rejection of Qualcomm–Broadcom Deal Followed Monthslong
Strategy, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rejection-of-qualcommbroadcom-deal-followed-monthslong-strategy-1520986563; accord Claude Barfield, So
Qualcomm Is a National Champion. Now What?, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Mar. 23, 2018), https:
//www.aei.org/technology-and-innovation/so-qualcomm-is-a-national-champion-now-what/.
62
See Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv-108, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017)
(order denying anti-suit injunction).
63
See In re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 82 Fed. Reg. 37899 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Aug. 14,
2017); In re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 834 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Jan. 8, 2018).
The former investigation concluded with a finding of no infringement, see In re Certain Mobile
Elec. Devices, 84 Fed. Reg. 12292 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Apr. 1, 2019); the latter settled, see In
re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 84 Fed. Reg. 44330 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Aug. 23, 2019). See
generally Shara Tibken, Apple and Qualcomm Settle Licensing Dispute Amid Trial’s Opening
Arguments, CNET (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-and-qualcomm-settlelicensing-dispute-during-opening-arguments/ (describing other litigation between Apple and
Qualcomm).
59
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a patent, the ITC must weigh whether exclusion would be in the “public
interest,” based on a list of four statutory factors.64 Apple argued, and the
administrative law judge at the ITC agreed, that exclusion would not be in the
public interest because of “a real and palpable likelihood the National Security
interests will be jeopardized.”65 At the time, the ITC judge found, Qualcomm
and Intel were the only two market suppliers of “premium baseband chip sets,”
the component that smartphones use to communicate with cell towers.66
Furthermore, Intel was found to be likely to exit the premium baseband chip
market if the ITC were to issue an exclusion order against Apple.67 Applying
a straightforward “[t]wo suppliers [are] better than one monopolist” theory of
market competition,68 the administrative law judge found that an exclusion
order that would have the effect of strangling Intel’s whole market share
would leave the United States undercompetitive in 5G technology—a risk to
“the preservation of a strong U.S. presence in the development of 5G and thus
the national security of the United States.”69
The ITC granted review of the administrative law judge’s determination
and invited public comment on the public interest question,70 which sparked a
wave of debate over patents and national security. Supporters of the decision
(of which this Article’s author was one) largely agreed with the administrative
law judge’s findings.71 Critics of the decision, on the other hand, followed a
line similar to CFIUS’s reasoning, contending that because Qualcomm was
the dominant U.S. firm, any harm to its status as leader (e.g., competition from
Intel) would diminish America’s 5G capacity and thus harm national
64

The statutory factors are “the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United
States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and
United States consumers.” Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(d)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2018) (as
amended); see Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19–28 (2012) (discussing ITC’s application of the public
interest factors).
65
See In re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, No. 337-TA-1065, at 196 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Sept.
28, 2018) (initial determination and recommended determination), available at https://www.
patentprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ALJ-Pender-ITC-Initial-Final-Decision-337TA-1065.pdf.
66
See id. at 190.
67
See id. at 191.
68
See id. at 192.
69
See id. at 195.
70
See In re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 64875 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Dec. 18,
2018).
71
See Public Interest Statement of the R Street Institute et al., In re Certain Mobile Elec.
Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 54138 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Oct. 26, 2018) (Inv. No. 337-TA-1065);
Public Interest Submission of the R Street Institute et al., Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 83 Fed.
Reg. 64875 (Feb. 6, 2019) (Inv. No. 337-TA-1065), available at https://www.rstreet.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/comments-itc-1065-qva-long.pdf; Bill Watson, Abusing Trade Law to
Ban iPhones Is Not in the Public Interest, THE HILL (Dec. 9, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/
technology/420425-abusing-trade-law-to-ban-iphones-is-not-in-the-public-interest; Ashley
Durkin-Rixey, Patents and the Public Interest: What Does the ITC Ruling Against Qualcomm
Really Mean?, ACT — APP ASS’N (Dec. 3, 2018), https://actonline.org/2018/12/03/patents-andthe-public-interest-what-does-the-itc-ruling-against-qualcomm-really-mean/.
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security.72 Although the ITC ultimately decided the investigation on other
grounds and Qualcomm settled with Apple shortly thereafter,73 the ITC had
flushed out a vigorous debate over how patent policy and competition affect
national security.
3.

The Federal Trade Commission

Apple was not the only one to charge Qualcomm with anticompetitive
behavior: A spate of foreign competition agencies had charged Qualcomm
with demanding excessive royalties in violation of competition laws across
the mid-2010s.74 In 2017, their American counterpart, the Federal Trade
Commission, followed suit by bringing an action against Qualcomm in the
Northern District of California for violations of the Sherman and FTC Acts.75
The premise of Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Inc. (“FTC v.
Qualcomm”) was reasonably straightforward: Qualcomm held a marketdominant position over certain mobile communications chips, and it leveraged
that monopoly to overcharge phone manufacturers for patent licenses through
a “no license–no chips” policy under which Qualcomm would refuse to sell
chips without first reaching a licensing deal on a bundle of patents.76
Yet again, national security was not an issue in the district court
litigation; “national security” is not mentioned once in the district court’s 233page findings of fact and conclusions of law.77 Once the trial had completed
in the FTC’s favor, however, national security did come to the fore. After an
appeal had been docketed in the Ninth Circuit, Qualcomm moved for a stay of

72
See, e.g., James Edwards, ITC’s Chance to Restore Reason and the Public Interest in the
Qualcomm v. Apple Case, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/
11/08/itcs-chance-to-restore-reason-and-the-public-interest-in-the-qualcomm-apple-case/id=
103078/ (citing CFIUS Letter, supra note 57). The other argument that these critics raised was
that application of the public interest to deny an exclusion order “is tantamount to abrogating the
rule of law,” on the theory that the statute requires exclusion as a remedy to patent infringement.
Id. That reasoning is puzzling given that statute specifically names the public interest factors as
reasons why “articles should not be excluded from entry.” Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(d)(1), 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (2018) (as amended).
73
See In re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 84 Fed. Reg. 12292 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Apr. 1,
2019); Don Clark & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple and Qualcomm Settle All Disputes
Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2019, at B1.
74
See Se Young Lee, South Korea Fines Qualcomm $854 Million for Violating Competition
Laws, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-antitrustidUSKBN14H062 (noting investigations in South Korea, China, the European Union, and
Taiwan); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d at 807, 675–76 (also noting
Japan), appeal filed, No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 13, 2020).
75
See Fed. Trade Comm’n, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 669.
76
See Complaint for Equitable Relief ¶¶ 2–7, at 2–3, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 411 F. Supp. 3d 658
(No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/
170117qualcomm_redacted_complaint.pdf; Timothy B. Lee, How Qualcomm Shook Down the
Cell Phone Industry for Almost 20 Years, ARS TECHNICA (May 30, 2019), https://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/2019/05/how-qualcomm-shook-down-the-cell-phone-industry-for-almost-20years/.
77
See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 658.
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enforcement of the district court judgment,78 and supporting Qualcomm’s
motion was a statement of interest from the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice.79 The statement of interest itself came as no surprise
given DOJ’s repeated criticisms of the application of antitrust law to patent
holders.80 But what was unusual was the inclusion of two declarations from
officials at the Department of Energy81 and the Department of Defense.82 Both
essentially recited the same argument: Qualcomm, being the dominant firm in
certain markets, was a provider of chips to both departments, and both
expressed concern that “it would be impossible to replace Qualcomm’s critical
role in 5G technology in the short-term,” so “[a]ny measure that
inappropriately reduces Qualcomm’s revenue substantially . . . could harm
national security.”83
In granting Qualcomm’s motion, the Ninth Circuit was apparently
swayed by these national security arguments. Citing to the DOD and DOE
declarations, the motions panel contemplated the possibility “that the
injunction threatens national security.”84 While the panel did not indicate
whether it agreed with the agencies’ positions, it did find the fact that “the
government itself is divided about the propriety of the judgment and its impact
on the public interest” sufficient to grant the motion to stay execution.85
Qualcomm’s pre-argument motion was not the last word on national
security in the case. Responding to and criticizing the contentions of the
Department of Justice and its supporting agencies, former Secretary of
Homeland Security Michael Chertoff explained in an op-ed in the Wall Street
Journal that “the view that a single manufacturer of a product critical national
defense should be, in effect, protected from competition” could be
“catastrophic” for national security.86 And at oral argument, the Ninth Circuit
panel questioned the attorney for the Department of Justice extensively on the
78
See Qualcomm’s Motion for Partial Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal, Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. July 8, 2019), Doc. No. 9.
79
See United States’ Statement of Interest Concerning Qualcomm’s Motion for Partial Stay of
Injunction Pending Appeal, Qualcomm, No. 19-16122 (July 16, 2019), Doc. No. 25.
80
See, e.g., Makan Delrahim, Address at the 19th Annual Berkeley–Stanford Advanced Patent
Law Institute: “Telegraph Road”: Incentivizing Innovation at the Intersection of Patent and
Antitrust Law (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-generalmakan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-19th-annual-berkeley-stanford (“I have criticized the
argument that it ought to be a violation of antitrust law for a holder of a standard-essential
patent, or SEP, to exclude competitors from using the technology . . . .”).
81
See Declaration of Department of Energy Chief Information Officer Max Everett, Qualcomm,
No. 19-16122 (July 16, 2019), Doc. No. 25-3 [hereinafter DOE Declaration].
82
See Declaration of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M.
Lord, Qualcomm, No. 19-16122 (July 16, 2019), Doc. No. 25-2 [hereinafter DOD Declaration].
83
Id. ¶ 16, at 7; see DOE Declaration, supra note 81, ¶ 10, at 6.
84
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 935 F.3d 752, 756 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2019) (per
curiam order on motion to stay).
85
Id.
86
Michael Chertoff, Qualcomm’s Monopoly Imperils National Security, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25,
2019, at A17.
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merits of the Department’s national security argument, expressing skepticism
where the Department “ha[d]n’t offered any market analysis or financial
evidence that the injunction would actually harm national security.”87 The
FTC v. Qualcomm case thus presents a clash of different perspectives on how
patents and competition policy affect national security.
D. Verizon and Huawei
It is difficult to discuss national security and technology policy without
mentioning the Chinese telecommunications manufacturer Huawei
Technologies.88 Recent events relating to that company also illuminate the
interactions between patents and national security.
Huawei has been a constant focus for national security. As noted above,
the company is one of China’s “national champions” receiving substantial
resources and assistance from the Chinese government.89 That relationship has
led national security experts to raise concerns about whether China can
leverage Huawei mobile communications infrastructure equipment for
espionage or surveillance purposes, by installing covert backdoors in software
for example.90 The U.S. Department of Commerce has placed Huawei on its
“entity list,” restricting American firms’ ability to do business with Huawei;91
the company has also been accused of industrial espionage, along the lines of
the “IP theft” issues discussed above.92

87
Matthew Renda, Qualcomm, FTC Spar at 9th Circuit over What Makes a Monopoly,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/qualcomm-ftcspar-over-what-makes-a-monopoly-at-ninth-circuit-hearing/ (quoting Murphy, J.).
88
The company has its own tag on the national security policy blog Lawfare, with
approximately thirty-five entries between February 2018 and February 2020. See Huawei –
Tags, LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/tagged/huawei (last visited Apr. 26, 2020). By
contrast, during the same time period, there have been only fifteen entries on that blog tagged
for encryption, another major national security policy issue. See Encryption – Tags, LAWFARE,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/tagged/encryption (last visited Apr. 26, 2020).
89
See Nakashima, supra note 34 and accompanying text.
90
See Bojan Pancevski, U.S. Officials Say Huawei Can Covertly Access Telecom Networks,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-officials-say-huawei-cancovertly-access-telecom-networks-11581452256. But see HUAWEI CYBER SEC. EVALUATION
CTR. OVERSIGHT BD., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM § 3.18 (Mar. 2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/790270/HCSEC_OversightBoardReport-2019.pdf (finding
that risks of Huawei technologies stem from “[p]oor software engineering and cybersecurity
processes,” not intentional espionage channels as “a result of Chinese state interference”); Lily
Hay Newman, Huawei’s Problem Isn’t Chinese Backdoors. It’s Buggy Software, WIRED (Mar.
28, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/huawei-threat-isnt-backdoors-its-bugs/.
91
See Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List and Revision of Entries on the Entity List,
84 Fed. Reg. 43493, 43495–96 (Bureau of Indus. & Sec., Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 21, 2019)
(codified at 15 C.F.R. PART 744, SUPPLEMENT 4); 15 C.F.R. § 744.11(a) (requiring a license “to
export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) any item subject to the EAR to an entity that is listed
on the Entity List”).
92
See Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 8–10, at 3–4, United States v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. 1:18-cr457 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020) (Doc. No. 126), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/
1248961/download. See also sources cited supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
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As a telecommunications firm, Huawei also is a substantial player in
patents. For 5G technology, Huawei leads in the number of patent families
declared as essential to the 5G standard, with 3,325 declared families of which
1,337 have at least one granted patent.93 The company reportedly holds 56,492
active patents worldwide overall,94 and has already engaged in high-stakes
patent litigation worldwide.95
Huawei’s patent capabilities notably reached American shores in June
2019, when the company initiated demands that Verizon Communications
take licenses to over 200 Huawei patents.96 Negotiations escalated over the
following months, until Huawei filed suit against Verizon in early 2020.97
Huawei was reportedly seeking “more than $1 billion” in royalties.98 Reports
of these licensing demands led several senators to propose legislation that
would block Huawei and like companies from asserting or licensing patents,99
though those proposals were widely panned by patent practitioners worried
that cutting back on the assertion value of patents would devalue patent
protection and encourage China into “tit-for-tat restriction on patent
enforcement.”100

93
See IPLYTICS GMBH, WHO IS LEADING THE 5G PATENT RACE? A PATENT LANDSCAPE
ANALYSIS ON DECLARED 5G PATENTS AND 5G STANDARDS CONTRIBUTIONS 5 tbl.1 (2019),
https://www.iplytics.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Who-Leads-the-5G-Patent-Race_2019.
pdf.
94
See Susan Decker, Huawei Has 56,492 Patents and It’s Not Afraid to Use Them, BLOOMBERG
(June 14, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-14/huawei-has-56-492patents-and-it-s-not-afraid-to-use-them (citing data from analytics firm).
95
See, e.g., Takashi Kawakami, Samsung and Huawei Drop Lawsuits in Latest Smartphone
Truce, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (May 15, 2019), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/
Samsung-and-Huawei-drop-lawsuits-in-latest-smartphone-truce; Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs.
Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R. 477; Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., [2018]
EWCA (Civ) 2344 (Eng.), available at https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2018/2344.
pdf.
96
See Sarah Krouse, Huawei Presses Verizon to Pay for Patents, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-presses-verizon-to-pay-for-patents-11560354414.
97
See Complaint, Huawei Techs. Co. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 6:20-cv-00090 (W.D.
Tex. Feb. 5, 2020), 2020 WL 592355.
98
David Shepardson, Huawei Asks Verizon to Pay Over $1 Billion for Over 230 Patents:
source, REUTERS (June 12, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech-verizonpatents-idUSKCN1TD218; accord Paul Mozur & Edmund Lee, Huawei Is Said to Demand
Patent Fees From Verizon, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/
technology/huawei-verizon-patent-license-fees.html (reporting unnamed sources claiming that
“Huawei’s claims would exceed $1 billion in fees”).
99
See Patricia Zengerle, Senator Rubio Targets Huawei over Patents, REUTERS (June 18, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech-usa-senate-idUSKCN1TI2T3; 165 CONG. REC.
S3573 (daily ed. June 13, 2019) (Senate Amendment 551 introduced by Sen. Rubio); Prevent
Abuse of the Legal System Act, S. 2178, 116th Cong. secs. 2(b)–c (July 18, 2019).
100
Jacob Schindler, Rubio’s Huawei Proposal Should Worry US Tech, Pharma Companies,
IAM MAG. (June 23, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/rubios-huawei-proposalshould-worry-us-tech-pharma-companies; see also Kieren McCarthy, You’re Huawei Off Base
on This, Rubio: Lawyers Slam US Senator’s Bid to Ban Chinese Giant from Filing Patent
Lawsuits, THE REGISTER (June 21, 2019), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/06/21/huawei_
patents_rubio/.
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Though national security has not so far been the main focus of the
Verizon–Huawei patent dispute, that dispute adds an important dimension to
the relationship between patents and national security.101 The arguments in
discourse over Qualcomm102 and Chinese technological races103 have focused
on how patent protection affects American firms’ activities with respect to
national security—whether patents or competition will better encourage
American companies to innovate more, for example. But Huawei’s assertion
of patents suggests that patent protection enables foreign firms to affect
national security.104 If foreign companies are able to tie up American firms in
years of patent litigation, then the diversion of domestic resources from
research and development to legal disputes may interfere with success in
technology races for AI and telecommunications. Since international
agreements prevent the United States from discriminating between domestic
and foreign inventors with respect to patents,105 the possibility that patents
could serve as a tool for foreign competitors to harass American firms is
something that national security experts need to consider carefully.
II.

PATENTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN HISTORY

While current disputes have brought attention to the interplay between
patents and national security, they are not the first time those areas have
crossed paths. On multiple occasions throughout history, patent licensing has
intersected with national security. In particular, considered below are
examples of those intersections that illustrate how aggressive use of patents
has left the United States ill-prepared to face contemporary threats. These
examples contain important lessons about the relationship among patents,
competition, and national security.
To be sure, patents are important incentives for innovation that drive the
development of new technologies including those that better protect
Americans, and patent-holding inventors are due reasonable compensation for
their inventive work. The problems have arisen not from the mere existence

101
See generally Charles Duan, Do Patents Protect National Security?, LAWFARE (July 12,
2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/do-patents-protect-national-security.
102
See supra Part I.C.
103
See supra Part I.A.
104
See also Mike Masnick, Once Again, China Is About to Use the US’s Obsession with
“Intellectual Property” Against Us, TECHDIRT (May 30, 2019), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20190521/23373342258/once-again-china-is-about-to-use-uss-obsession-withintellectual-property-against-us.shtml (noting Chinese practices of using “patents to block
American competitors and to even block US companies in other countries”).
105
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 3, para. 1,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 302 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (“Each Member shall accord to the
nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals
with regard to the protection of intellectual property . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
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of patents, but from their owners’ decisions to leverage them to extract as
much private value as possible without concern for public consequences.
A. Pre-World War I Torpedo Development
The development of the torpedo offers a useful example for the present
study because it shows the dangers of the United States being dependent on a
single monopoly producer of critical technology.
At the start of the 20th century, it was apparent that naval supremacy
was contingent on torpedoes. A 1903 U.S. Naval War College conference
report concluded, based on simulations of U.S.–German naval battles, that
torpedoes “turn the scale of battle in their favor in a most decided manner”
and recommended arming ships with them.106 This jolted the Navy’s Bureau
of Ordnance into accelerating its torpedo development work, and in particular
forming a public–private partnership in 1904 with the E.W. Bliss Company
and its engineer Frank M. Leavitt to develop and manufacture the thenexperimental Bliss–Leavitt torpedo.107
Unfortunately, “what was commercially valuable for the Bliss Company
was not necessarily militarily valuable for the Navy,” and patent licensing
became a focal point of that misalignment.108 The Bliss Company was a
licensee of key patents on the superheater, a technology for torpedo
propulsion.109 Bliss negotiated with the government to license those patents
from 1905 through 1912, ultimately dragging the government into litigation
through 1920.110 Nor was the government blameless: It sought its own patent
on torpedo stabilization, which further bungled the relationship between Bliss
and the government.111
Two problems arose, at least in part because of this patent infighting
between Bliss and the government. The decades of litigation likely consumed
resources from both sides that could otherwise have been put to innovation.112
Moreover, the patent disputes reflected a larger campaign on the part of Bliss
to monopolize the torpedo market at the expense of the U.S. government. In
1906, Bureau head N.E. Mason wrote that “the Bureau has been handicapped
by the knowledge that, due to the monopoly held by the company, the Bureau
would have to accept the terms offered or get no torpedoes. The Bureau has
become convinced that a belief in the helplessness of the Government has

106
KATHERINE C. EPSTEIN, TORPEDO: INVENTING THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN THE
UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 68–69 (2014).
107
See id. at 69–70.
108
Id. at 73.
109
See E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 253 U.S. 187, 188 (1920) [hereinafter Bliss II].
110
See id. at 189–90; EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 93–94.
111
See E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 37, 40 (1918) [hereinafter Bliss I]; EPSTEIN,
supra note 106, at 82–83.
112
See Bliss I, 248 U.S. at 40; Bliss II, 253 U.S. at 189–90.
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influenced the E. W. Bliss Company in its prices, deliveries and
workmanship.”113
Dependence on an exclusive domestic torpedo innovator would have
consequences. Bliss ultimately failed to deliver on its promises for the Bliss–
Leavitt torpedo and, by 1907, had to ask the Bureau to reduce the performance
minimums in the contract.114 Mark Bristol of the Naval Torpedo Station
connected that failure to the Bliss Company’s efforts at monopolization,
lecturing in 1909 that company’s “ ‘get rich quick’ scheme” had left it “failing
to improve the turbine” such that “the Bliss–Leavitt torpedo today is inferior
to the Whitehead,” its foreign competitor with close ties to the AustroHungarian Empire.115 His observation is consistent with the general trend of
dominant market power diminishing incentives to innovate.116
With Bliss unable to make torpedoes up to spec, the Bureau in 1907
found itself forced to turn to those Austrian Whitehead torpedoes, first
purchasing them and then licensing the rights to manufacture.117 Thus, on the
eve of World War I, the U.S. Navy was “scarcely equipped to enter the war”
and indeed dependent on war technology sourced from an empire that would
soon be an enemy.118
Besides showing how patent posturing can affect national security, the
Bliss–Leavitt torpedo debacle highlights the dangers of American dependence
on single-firm supply. In a current environment where the United States
government concedes its own dependence on monopoly suppliers such as
Qualcomm for security-critical technologies,119 it should be alarming that a
century ago, monopoly in also-critical torpedo technology nearly sunk the
Navy.

113
EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 86 (quoting letter from Mason to the Secretary of the Navy,
Oct. 17, 1906).
114
See id. at 88.
115
Id. at 102. The Whitehead factory was based in Fiume (Rijeka), a naval base of the AustroHungarian Navy, and the torpedo was developed for the Austrian navy. See LAWRENCE
SONDHAUS, THE NAVAL POLICY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, 1867–1918, at 47–48 (1994). Robert
Whitehead, the torpedo inventor and factory namesake, was also the grandfather of Agathe
Whitehead, whose famously Austrian husband was Captain Georg von Trapp. See Joan Gearin,
Movie vs. Reality: The Real Story of the Von Trapp Family, PROLOGUE MAG. (Winter 2005),
https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2005/winter/von-trapps-html; Alan
Wolstencroft, The Whitehead Story, 59 MARINER’S MIRROR 345, 347 (1973).
116
See infra notes 183–185.
117
See EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 87 (quoting letters from Bureau head N.E. Mason to the
Secretary of the Navy); Naval Service Appropriations Act, ch. 2512, § 1, 34 STAT. 1176, 1180
(1907).
118
EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 103.
119
See, e.g., DOD Declaration, supra note 82, ¶ 5 (“DoD national security programs . . . rely on
continued access to Qualcomm products . . . . Any disruption of supply of Qualcomm products
or services to the U.S. Government, or of Qualcomm’s related R&D, even for a short period of
time, could have a detrimental impact on national security.”).
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B. Aviation and the Wright Brothers
On the eve of World War I, the United States stood at a stark
disadvantage to Europe in the air: The government in 1913 held 6 military
airplanes to France’s 266, and a federal official lamented that the country had
fallen “from first place to last of all the great nations in the air.”120 The root
cause of this deficiency was again aggressive patent licensing, in this case
instigated by no less than Orville and Wilbur Wright.
The Wright brothers are famous for solving the key lateral-roll problem
of aviation;121 they are infamous for aggressively litigating the resulting
patent. Throughout the early 1900s, the Wrights filed multiple suits against
their main competitor, airplane manufacturer Glenn Curtiss, in what the
newspapers termed the “patent wars.”122 They also sued foreign aviators at
American exhibitions, often springing the lawsuits unexpectedly on the
aviators or show exhibitors immediately after the shows.123
How did airplane patent litigation contribute to America’s technological
lag? The conventional theory is that the Wrights’ patent licensing demands
dissuaded American firms from investing in aviation technology,124 but a
handful of dissenting historians reply that substantial investment in aviation
was occurring in the United States.125 Evaluating this disagreement is not
straightforward. The dissenters are correct that there was not a total industry
holdup, but it is unclear whether investment was nevertheless depressed or
was falling behind Europe, where for a variety of reasons patent litigation was

120
TOM D. CROUCH, WINGS: A HISTORY OF AVIATION FROM KITES TO THE SPACE AGE 147
(2003).
121
See U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (issued May 22, 1906); Wright Co. v. Herring–Curtiss Co., 204
F. 597, 600 (W.D.N.Y. 1913), aff’d, 211 F. 654 (2d Cir. 1914) (per curiam).
122
End Patent Wars of Aircraft Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1917, at 5; see Wright Co. v.
Herring–Curtiss Co., 177 F. 257, 261 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1910) (granting preliminary injunction);
Wright Co. v. Herring–Curtiss Co., 211 F. 654 (2d Cir. 1914) (per curiam) (final appeal). Upon
the Wrights’ litigation victory in 1914, Curtiss devised a workaround and the Wrights promptly
sued again; that case never went to trial and was ultimately mooted by the creation of an
aviation patent pool in 1917. See FRED C. KELLY, THE WRIGHT BROTHERS 296 (Dover Publ’ns
1989).
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See Herbert A. Johnson, The Wright Patent Wars and Early American Aviation, 69 J. AIR L.
& COM. 21, 31–33 (2004); Wright Co. v. Paulhan, 177 F. 261, 271 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
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See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 123, at 42–43; 1 ALEX ROLAND, MODEL RESEARCH: THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS 1915–1958, at 38 (1985); Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
839, 890–91 (1990); Scott McCartney, Wright Brothers’ Patent Battle Proved Costly in
Aviation Race, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2003), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB107159573141697200; Phaedra Hise, How The Wright Brothers Blew It, FORBES (Nov. 19,
2003), https://www.forbes.com/2003/11/19/1119aviation.html.
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See Tom D. Crouch, Blaming Wilbur and Orville: The Wright Patent Suits and the Growth of
American Aeronautics, in ATMOSPHERIC FLIGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 290–91 (Peter
Galison & Alex Roland eds., 2000); Ron D. Katznelson & John Howells, The Myth of the Early
Aviation Patent Hold-up—How a US Government Monopsony Commandeered Pioneer Airplane
Patents, 24 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1, 11 (2014).
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not as prevalent.126 Furthermore, there is disagreement as to whether the
demanded royalties were “almost confiscatory”127 or not.128 It is perhaps
notable, though, that the demanded royalty is strikingly like Qualcomm’s: The
Wright–Martin company demanded 5–10% on gross receipts (not net profits)
of finished products (not the smallest salable patent-practicing unit) on all
airplane-related products (not just those using the patent) including
accessories, instruments, training school tuition, and flight show tickets.129
A better explanation of the Wrights’ impact on aviation innovation is
found in the economic theory of “knowledge spillovers.” Economists posit
that much innovation in and across industries occurs when researchers are in
close proximity with each other, such that knowledge can informally “spill
over” within the community and particularly within countries.130 The spillover
effect is most prominent when the community contains a diversity of
innovators, such that “local competition promotes growth.”131
In view of this economic theory, it becomes apparent that a driving cause
of the lack of aviation innovation in the United States was a lack of knowledge
spillovers stemming from the Wrights’ patent litigation. The result of their
suing foreign aviators and enjoining aviation exhibitions was that “all the
foreign aviators of note have assured that they will not sign contracts to
appear” in the United States while litigation was pending.132 And the ongoing,
bitter litigation between Curtiss and the Wrights meant that two of the most
powerful American innovators were essentially out of commission for
years.133 Without a robust influx of experts and technologists, innovation
could not occur in the United States at the same rate as in Europe, which by
1910 had outstripped the United States in airplane motor and wing design.134
Thus, “the Wrights virtually isolated American aviation from knowledge of
rapid European improvement of airplane design and manufacture.”135
126
See Johnson, supra note 123, at 25; Christine MacLeod, Reluctant Entrepreneurs: Patents
and State Patronage in New Technosciences, Circa 1870—1930, 103 ISIS 328, 337 (2012).
127
See LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, BIRDMEN: THE WRIGHT BROTHERS, GLENN CURTISS, AND THE
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See Katznelson & Howells, supra note 125, at 33–34.
129
See Application for License and Form of Agreement of the Wright–Martin Aircraft
Corporation, in 54 CONG. REC. 3238 (1917); cf. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 935
F.3d 752, 672–74 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 13, 2020). All this was stacked on top of whatever
royalty Curtiss intended to demand. See Makers Must Buy a Curtiss License, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
20, 1916, at 14.
130
See Adam B. Jaffe et al., Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by
Patent Citations, 108 Q.J. ECON. 577, 578 (1993).
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Edward L. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1126, 1129 (1992).
132
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SUNDAY GLOBE, Mar. 13, 1910, at 11; see GOLDSTONE, supra note 127, at 200.
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See GOLDSTONE, supra note 127, at 236 (“For Glenn Curtiss and the Wrights, whose
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See id. at 236–37.
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Indeed, even one of the dissenting historians appears to support this
knowledge spillover issue. “Strenuous competition between a relatively large
number of designers and aviators in Europe,” Dr. Tom D. Crouch explains,
“led to the exploration of a wide range of configurations, the use of new
materials, and improved control systems and power plants.”136 By contrast,
American aviators “had not been tested under the constant pressure to fly
higher, faster and farther against a wide range of competitors,” leaving them
and American airplane manufacturers “largely committed to the original
configuration of the Wright airplane” and with “little incentive to change.”137
Crouch concludes that the greater prevalence of air shows and exhibitions in
Europe drove this competitive pressure toward innovation,138 but overlooks
the fact that the dearth of air shows in the United States was a direct result of
patent litigation.
This knowledge spillover problem should cast a long shadow over patent
policy. The lesson of the early aviation industry is that a dominant market
position, in combination with aggressive patent licensing that keeps a whole
industry under the patent holder’s thumb, can deny the United States the
advantage of innovative collaborations and knowledge spillovers. Given the
extensive control that a handful of patent-holding firms exert over the mobile
telecommunications market,139 one might anticipate parallel consequences in
that industry today. And indeed, Qualcomm’s patent litigation arguably
contributed to the loss of a key American 5G innovator, Intel.140 Allowing
market concentration to clog the knowledge spillover pathway to innovation
could thus deny American superiority in key technologies now, just as it did a
century ago.
C. Bioterrorism in the Wake of September 11
Aggressive patent licensing imperiled national security again in 2001 by
jeopardizing the ability of the United States to protect the public from threats
of bioterrorism. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, there was an
immediate and credible threat of a mass attack of weaponized anthrax immune
to traditional antibiotics.141 Defending against this threat required a stockpile
of treatments ready to deploy in cities of millions blanketed with airborne
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9, 2001) (statement of Sen. Bill Frist); Elisabeth Bumiller, Public Health Or Public Relations,
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anthrax spores.142 At the time, only one treatment was approved to treat
anthrax: ciprofloxacin, or Cipro, an antibiotic manufactured—and patented—
by the pharmaceutical firm Bayer AG.
Two problems arose out of Bayer’s patent. First, Bayer’s prices for the
drug were exceptionally high—35 times the cost of identical generics.143
Second and more problematic was Bayer’s own production capacity. The
government estimated it would need a stockpile of 60 days’ treatment for 12
million people.144 Generic manufacturers estimated they could fill that need in
3 months, but Bayer determined that its own factories would require
“20 months, working 24 hours a day” to fulfill the requisition.145 Nevertheless,
Bayer refused to permit generics to manufacture the drug.146
Bayer’s stance left the Bush administration torn between honoring the
company’s patent and readying for a mass anthrax disaster. On the one hand,
the government could have invoked its powers under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to
allow generic entry at the cost of “reasonable and entire compensation.”147 But
“breaking” Bayer’s patents would have been globally hypocritical in light of
the government’s arguments that South Africa could not do the same to patents
on AIDS treatments.148 On the other hand, it would have been no less
hypocritical for the government to leave the American public unprotected,
especially given that it had been giving Cipro to White House staff as of
September 11.149
The Health and Human Services Department initially avoided invoking
§ 1498, hoping to negotiate a deal between Bayer and the generic
manufacturers.150 But as political pressure mounted, HHS changed course and
prepared to call for legislation circumventing Bayer’s patent, forcing Bayer
142
See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-ISC-559, PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
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pdf.
143
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20011023/aponline201158_000.htm.
150
See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Bayer May Ask Its Rivals for Help Producing Anthrax Antibiotic
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into a concession of selling Cipro to the government at a fire-sale 50%
discount.151 Though HHS denied doing so in its public comments, Bayer’s
subsequent investor statements suggest that HHS did leverage its § 1498
powers to induce the deal.152
Throughout and after this patent squabble, Bayer and its supporters
contended that the high patent-based prices for Cipro were necessary
innovation incentives, not a profit-maximizing overcharge at the expense of
the public.153 Subsequent facts would point in a different direction. Two years
later, in 2003, Bayer would plead guilty to Medicaid fraud and pay a $257
million fine for a five-year-long scheme of overcharging the government for
Cipro.154
III.

COMPETITION AND CYBERSECURITY

In addition to the historical review done so far, another approach to
understanding the relationship among patents, competition, and national
security is to consider the role of cybersecurity. There is little doubt that
computer system vulnerabilities that enable hacking and spread of computer
exploits are a threat to the nation’s defenses, so better cybersecurity is a key
part of national security strategy.155
Strong competition can thus complement national security by enhancing
domestic cybersecurity, and patent assertion that unduly weakens competition
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detracts from cybersecurity.156 Competition promotes better cybersecurity in
at least two ways. First, multiple studies show that competition encourages
firms to improve their products on multiple vectors including cybersecurity.
Second, competition avoids a situation that security experts call a
“monoculture,” which increases vulnerability to severe cyberattacks. As
former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff wrote recently, “We
need competition and multiple providers, not a potentially vulnerable
technological monoculture,” to guarantee national security.157 Thus,
cybersecurity provides a useful lens for understanding how unfettered patent
assertion and licensing can detract from national security.
A. Cybersecurity as Competitive Value-Add
Competition enhances national security by reducing the incidence of
technical vulnerabilities. That effect is especially important for securitysensitive systems such as mobile telecommunications.
Intuitively, a causal chain from competition to cybersecurity makes
logical sense. Computer security is a value-added benefit to consumers, so
firms in competitive markets are likely to use security to gain an edge over
their competitors.158 In monopolized markets, though, there may be less
external impetus to test products for flaws, and the monopolist may choose to
focus less on security and more on new product features or increased product
quality.
Economic research confirms these hypotheses about competition leading
to better cybersecurity. A 2009 empirical study of web browsers considered
the impact of market concentration on the amount of time that vendors took to
fix security vulnerabilities as they were discovered.159 The study found that
the presence of more competitors correlated with faster cybersecurity
response—a reduction of 8–10 days in response time per additional market
rival.160 Similarly, business researchers in 2005 modeled incentives for firms
to engage in sharing of cybersecurity information, and concluded that the
“inclination to share information and invest in security technologies increases
156
This is not to say that competition is the sole ingredient to increasing cybersecurity. As Paul
Rosenzweig explains, there are appropriate regulatory measures to be taken to promote
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congressional-testimony-paul-rosenzweig-on-choosing-the-right-cybersecurity-standards/
(statement of Paul Rosenzweig).
157
Chertoff, supra note 86.
158
See Sadegh Farhang et al., An Economic Study of the Effect of Android Platform
Fragmentation on Security Updates, 22 INT’L CONF. ON FIN. CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA
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take into account security, then vendors have to invest to improve their security quality”).
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as the degree of competitiveness in an industry increases.”161 Another study
found that, where two software firms are in competition, at least one will be
willing to take on some degree of risk and responsibility for cybersecurity,
whereas a monopoly software firm will consistently fail to accept such
responsibility.162 To be sure, an unpublished study from 2017 found that some
market concentration can make firms more responsive to cybersecurity issues,
but only to a point: “being in a dominant position reduces the positive effect
of having less competitors on the responsiveness of the vendor,” and indeed
the “more dominant the firm is, the less rapid it is in releasing security
patches.”163 This research confirms that competition is more conducive to
cybersecurity.
It is not hard to see how this applies to emerging communication
technologies markets. In the absence of competition, the above research
suggests that device manufacturers, chip makers, and software developers will
lack incentives to respond to vulnerabilities, to share information about
cybersecurity practices and issues, and to take responsibility for security
matters. Mobile phone chips have had their share of cybersecurity failures
already.164 The best way to flush out ongoing and future cybersecurity issues
is to maintain competitive pressure at all levels of the supply chain.
B. Vulnerabilities of “Monocultures”
A second reason why monopoly undermines cybersecurity is that
monopoly leads to a “monoculture” of single-vendor products, opening the
door to massive systemic failure in the case of a cyberattack. Computer
researchers developed the theory of software monocultures in the early 2000s,
in response to the regular phenomenon of computer viruses and other attacks
spreading rapidly by exploiting flaws in the dominant operating system at the
time, Microsoft Windows.165 Where a computer system such as Windows has
a commanding share of users, a virus that exploits a flaw in that system can
161
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quickly spread to infect a whole interconnected ecosystem. An operating
system monopoly thus enables fast and easy spread of cyberattacks, and better
cybersecurity would be achieved through greater diversity in online
systems.166 As one research group posited, “a network architecture that
supports a collection of heterogeneous network elements for the same
functional capability offers a greater possibility of surviving security attacks
as compared to homogeneous networks.”167
There has been considerable study of the theory that computer
monocultures are naturally more vulnerable to attacks.168 In one study,
computer science researchers reviewed a catalog of 6,340 software
vulnerabilities recorded in 2007, to compare whether comparable software
would share the same flaws.169 Of the 2,627 vulnerabilities applicable to
application software (as opposed to operating systems, web scripts, and other
software components), only 29 (1.1%) applied to substitute products from
different vendors but providing the same functionality.170 By contrast,
different versions of a single software product were found to share
vulnerabilities 84.7% of the time.171 Thus, software monocultures share
exploitable flaws even when there is some variation in versions across the
monoculture; by contrast, diversity in software is almost guaranteed to prevent
a single flaw from affecting all users.
In the case of 5G and wireless mobile communications, a monoculture
is an especially concerning possibility. To the extent that systems such as
smart city sensors or communication networks are widely deployed in a
monoculture fashion, a widespread attack could have devastating
consequences, potentially blacking out a region and affecting essential
services such as 911.172 A monoculture that is vulnerable to so-called
“rootkits” or “backdoors”—maliciously installed software that enable bad
actors to commandeer systems—could also enable mass surveillance or spying
by private hackers or foreign governments.173 The presence of systems from
multiple vendors would mitigate these possibilities.
166

See id.
Yongguang Zhang et al., Heterogeneous Networking: A New Survivability Paradigm, NEW
SECURITY PARADIGMS WORKSHOP 2001, at 33, 34 (Sept. 2001), https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.
1145/508171. 508177.
168
See generally Benoit Baudry & Martin Monperrus, The Multiple Facets of Software
Diversity: Recent Developments in Year 2000 and Beyond, ACM COMPUTING SURVS. art. 16, §
5.2 (Sept. 2015), https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2807593.
169
See Jin Han et al., On the Effectiveness of Software Diversity: A Systematic Study on RealWorld Vulnerabilities, 6 PROC. INT’L CONF. ON DETECTION OF INTRUSIONS & MALWARE, &
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 127, 129–30 (2009).
170
See id. at 133–34.
171
See id. at 140.
172
See David Moore et al., Inside the Slammer Worm, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, July–Aug.
2003, at 33, 37.
173
Cf. Devlin Barrett, Americans’ Cellphones Targeted in Secret U.S. Spy Program, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/americans-cellphones-targeted-in-secret-u-sspy-program-1415917533 (discussing technology for surveillance of cell phone calls enabled by
167

398

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 36

The monoculture theory is not without critics, but a review of those
criticisms shows them to be inapplicable to contemporary communication
technologies. Some critics suggest that software diversity imposes
unwarranted costs on firms who must forego economies of scale and devise
seemingly duplicative yet different setups of computer systems.174 But those
concerns largely focus on the situation where a single firm produces and
manages heterogeneous systems, concerns that are avoided where
heterogeneity arises naturally through competition between two unrelated
firms. Critics also argue that technological measures can create “artificial
diversity” through automated randomization of software code, so software
engineers can purportedly solve monoculture issues and device users need not
worry about the issue.175 But even these critics acknowledge that artificial
diversity techniques are often insufficient because they must make
assumptions about what aspects of the technology are most vulnerable to
attack, and they concede that artificial diversity cannot stop attacks involving
operation of legitimate software functions in undesirable ways (sending spam
emails or deleting document files, for example).176
It is widely recognized that a monoculture is unavoidable in at least one
respect: Most connected devices will need to conform to technical
standards.177 5G, for example, is a technical standard developed by a private
industry consortium called 3GPP.178 A flaw in any such standard would render
all mobile devices implementing the standard vulnerable to an identical
attack.179 Avoiding these sorts of systemic flaws in standards requires rigorous
development, analysis, and testing of the standard in the development process,
which in turn requires ensuring that as many firms as possible, especially firms
that share basic American values, are involved in the development of those
standards.180 Thus, the necessary standardization of information and
communication technologies is perhaps the most important reason why a
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competitive communication technology market is essential to cybersecurity
and national security.
IV.

LESSONS AND POLICY DIRECTIONS

The above discussion shows that patent protection can have mixed
effects on national security: On the one hand, patents can encourage
innovation that ensures domestic technological leadership and produces useful
security-protective technologies; on the other hand, patents can stifle
innovation-producing and cybersecurity-enhancing competition and can
stymie the government’s own ability to achieve national security goals. To
navigate the complex effects of patent policy on national security,
policymakers may consider the following recommendations as guideposts.
A. Anticompetitive Patent Licensing
An area of particular concern should be the use of patents and patent
licensing strategies to diminish competition or put up roadblocks to new
entrants. Policymakers should certainly not support these abuses of the patent
system, and indeed should take steps to prevent them.
In the mobile communications space, patent licensing already plays an
outsized role. There are reportedly between 250,000181 and 314,000182 patents
on the smartphone alone, and litigation over cell phone technologies has lasted
decades by now. Patents will thus inevitably have an impact on technologies
like 5G or the Internet of Things, so the question is what that impact will be.
Patents are supposed to encourage innovation, but research finds that
patents alone will not do so; competition is another requirement. A 2015 study
considered the impact of competition policy and patent strength on innovation
among European firms, measured in terms of research and development
spending.183 Initially, the study compared firms in countries with strong patent
laws against those in countries with weaker patent laws, and found that patent
protection has “no effect on R&D intensity,” a conclusion consistent with
multiple other studies.184 However, the study found that when a major
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competition reform went into effect, strong-patent countries enjoyed a boost
in innovation greater than that experienced in weak-patent countries.185 In
other words, strong patent protection is complementary to strong competition;
the former does not promote innovation without the latter. The practical
import of this research is that patent protection is beneficial up to a point, but
to the extent that patents—or, more commonly, legal strategies involving
patents—overreach to suppress competition, that overreach should be cause
for concern.
Yet today, strategic patent behavior contrary to competition is prevalent.
The Federal Trade Commission’s ongoing lawsuit against mobile phone chip
manufacturer Qualcomm, for example, challenges Qualcomm’s practice of
refusing to sell chips to any phone manufacturer who does not first pay a hefty
sum for patent licenses—even if the manufacturer does not actually have need
for all those licenses.186 To the extent that Qualcomm’s “no license, no chips”
practice is in fact anticompetitive—that is what the courts overseeing the case
will decide—monopolization of that market could substantially harm
cybersecurity for the reasons noted above.187 The company’s about-50%
market share in the advanced mobile chip market188 means that there is a
virtual monoculture of Qualcomm chips already, and there are ongoing
concerns about security vulnerabilities in those chips.189 It is thus puzzling that
some have opposed the FTC litigation on the grounds that it is making the
United States “less competitive in the global 5G arms race.”190 As one scholar
explains, this rhetoric “smacks of ‘national champion’ thinking” and
ultimately fails to ensure that “national security warnings are being balanced
against competitive imperatives.”191
With respect to emerging information technologies, policymakers
should be concerned that a leading firm could undertake similar patent
licensing strategies to control the market. Indeed, the district court in the
Qualcomm litigation found that Nokia and Ericsson already “have imitated
Qualcomm’s practice” because it is “more lucrative.”192
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If patents end up being used systematically to suppress competition in
undue ways, then policymakers will need to pay greater attention to the
consequences of those uses of patents for national security, and likely take
legislative steps to reduce anticompetitive uses of patents. History provides a
guide for doing so. The legislative response to American inferiority in pre–
World War I aviation was the creation of a federal patent pool backed by
federal permission to condemn patents on aircraft,193 and the response to
Bayer’s hardball licensing of Cipro was for the government to use hardball
negotiations backed by § 1498.194
B. Prizes, Grants, and Other Incentives for Innovation
Patents are not the only incentive for innovation: Government policy
may also encourage innovation through a variety of means, including prizes
for inventions, research grants, and tax subsidies.195 Each has its advantages
and drawbacks: Patents offer theoretically market-based rewards but create
perverse incentives due to monopoly rights; prizes and grants avoid
anticompetitive opportunities but present moral hazard and valuation
difficulties.196
Despite the many tradeoffs among different forms of innovation
incentives, much of the literature and most policymakers have tended to
gravitate toward patents as the default tool of innovation policy.197
The national security dimension of innovation in view of technological
races, however, may suggest a need to alter that calculus. As seen above,
patents can force a nation into dependence on a single supplier of critical
technology, whether it be torpedoes, airplanes, or anthrax treatments.198 Prizes
or grants that allow for immediate free-market competition on any resulting
inventions may have the benefit of protecting the government and the public
from that single-supplier dependence. As a result, policymakers may seek to

193
See Naval Service Appropriations Act, ch. 180, 39 STAT. 1168, 1169 (1917) (appropriating
$1,000,000 to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy “to secure by purchase,
condemnation, donation, or otherwise, such basic patent or patents as they may consider
necessary to the manufacture and development of aircraft in the United States and its
dependencies, for governmental and civil purposes”); Johnson, supra note 123, at 57.
194
See supra Part II.C.
195
See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE L.J.
544, 551–52 (2019); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights,
57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1721 (2008).
196
See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 195, at 557 (“[N]o single innovation-incentive
mechanism is uniformly superior in all circumstances.”); Stiglitz, supra note 195, at 1722 tbl.1.
197
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1576 (2003) (“Patent law is our primary policy tool to promote innovation . . . .”); Henry
G. Grabowski et al., The Roles of Patents and Research and Development Incentives in
Biopharmaceutical Innovation, 34 HEALTH AFF. 302, 302 (2015) (“[P]atents and regulatory
exclusivity provisions are likely to remain the core approach to providing incentives for
biopharmaceutical research and development.”).
198
See supra Part II.

402

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 36

divert innovators in security-sensitive technology fields away from patents by
offering alternative rewards.
One difficulty is that because patent law generally applies uniformly to
all types of technologies,199 it may be difficult to leverage patent law itself to
discourage patenting of those technologies that are of particular relevance to
national security. Nevertheless, the government may leverage a variety of
approaches, such as open licensing requirements in grant agreements or prize
awards, or creation of patent pools with predefined licensing commitments, to
limit the likelihood that exclusive rights arise in technology areas of concern
to national security.
C. Economic Protectionism Versus Enhanced Competition
The various recent instances of patents and national security discussed
above have all carried at least some flavor of American competition against
foreign nations, especially China. That places the patent–national security
conversation well within the larger context of the Trump Administration’s
general positions on economic nationalism and purported national security
justifications for blocking foreign competitors.200 The Trump Administration
has taken numerous actions to limit the entry of foreign investment and
competition, often justifying those actions on national security grounds;
examples include the blocking of the Broadcom–Qualcomm merger by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS),201 the various
proposed and implemented bans on use of technology products made by
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Chinese firms such as Huawei and ZTE,202 and the steel and aluminum
tariffs.203
As a general matter, there are questions of whether these border-closing
measures are genuine protections from security threats or thinly veiled
economic protectionism.204 Even putting those questions aside, though, one
ought to be skeptical of the relevance of economic nationalism to patent policy
for a simple reason: The benefits of patents do not accrue solely to American
firms. The United States, as a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement, is obligated
to make patent protection available to foreigners on equal terms.205 As the
Verizon–Huawei patent dispute shows, foreign firms can use U.S. patents to
interfere with domestic businesses.206 That seemingly reversed situation of
foreign patent holders asserting American patents against American
companies is likely to recur, especially given that foreign inventors receive a
large share of currently issued patents: Chinese inventors received 11,241 U.S.
patents in 2017, making it one of the top five patent recipient nations that
year.207 If policymakers hope to protect national security through innovation
policy, then, they ought to consider that patent protection can have the
counterintuitive effect of enabling foreign companies to stymie American
efforts.
D. Protecting the Government Itself: The 2018 NDAA
Besides protecting competition and the public at large from harmfully
aggressive uses of patents, policymakers ought also to be concerned with
protecting the government itself from aggressive patent licensing. One
commonality among the three historical examples given earlier208 is that when
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the government itself is the buyer of patented technologies, it can easily
become the victim of costly licensing schemes.
Indeed, Congress has recently recognized this need to protect the
government in intellectual property licensing negotiations generally.
Section 802 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018
requires the Secretary of Defense to develop policy to ensure that government
license negotiators “are aware of the rights afforded the Federal Government
and contractors in intellectual property” and that they “fully consider and use
all available techniques and best practices for acquiring or licensing
intellectual property.”209 It further creates a “cadre” of IP experts to assist
military departments on “financial analysis and valuation of intellectual
property” and “communications and negotiations with contractors.”210
Legislative history confirms that section 802 is intended to protect the
government during licensing negotiations. The House report observes within
the Department of Defense “varying knowledge of IP matters” and expresses
concern that “inconsistency and lack of coordination disadvantages the
Department” such that “the Department requires tools to improve its ability to
negotiate with industry.”211 The conference report similarly characterizes the
IP cadre as supporting Department staff to “develop their IP strategies and
negotiate with industry.”212
Subsequent developments are of the same effect. In a press briefing,
Undersecretary of Defense Ellen M. Lord explained that the purpose of the IP
cadre was to avoid “problems with intellectual property when we don’t clearly
define what is owned by industry, and what will be owned by government.”213
Law firms specializing in government contracts describe section 802 as
“designed to ensure that DoD does not leave rights on the table when it
negotiates the scope of IP rights,”214 and even advise contractors to “beware”
that section 802 “will make the DoD a more effective purchaser of IP.”215
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The 2018 NDAA demonstrates an ongoing concern that IP licensing can
interfere with American national defense operations, and that policy solutions
are necessary to resist aggressive licensing. It is perhaps unfortunate, then, that
the Department of Defense concedes its vulnerability to a contractor’s patent
licensing practices and indeed says that the government’s operations depend
on that contractor’s patent licensing remaining untouched, at the same time
that Congress has instructed the Department of Defense to negotiate forcefully
against its contractors’ patent licensing practices.216 Both Congress and federal
agencies such as the Department of Defense should continue to be aware of
how intellectual property licensing practices can set back the government and
thus set back national security, and push back rather than acquiesce in those
licensing practices.
CONCLUSION
This article has looked at the recent policy conversations on patents and
national security, and questioned a common line of reasoning in those
conversations, namely an argument that increased patent protection will
increase national security. Both historical evidence and modern research into
cybersecurity offer reasons to dispute that argument. With regard to history,
patents have on multiple notable occasions interfered with the U.S.
government’s ability to prepare for war or protect the public from terrorism,
leaving the government forced to take sometimes forceful measures to resist
assertions of patent rights in the name of national security. With regard to
cybersecurity, economic and computer science research suggests that robust
competition enhances cybersecurity by giving technology firms market-based
incentives to secure their products, and by preventing vulnerable
monocultures from arising. Insofar as patents can suppress competition,
patents can thus be in tension with cybersecurity and national security. Based
on these identified tensions and historical predicaments, the article
recommends that policymakers take steps to account for the nuanced
relationship between patents and national security, and in particular focus on
policies that enhance competition rather than imposing patents on
technologies necessary to protecting the public.
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